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The Business Case for Complying With Bribery Laws
Abstract
This article addresses a gap in the common understanding of corruption. The rules regarding corruption
at both the macro- and the micro-level are well known, as are the consequences at the macro-level. The
consequences at the micro-level, however, particularly for business firms, are not well understood. With
respect to rules, at both the macro-and micro-levels the rules are very clear: do not pay bribes. At the
macro-level the consequences are well known: corruption has devastating effects on societies and
economies. Although not often referred to in most corruption literature, the consequences at the microlevel can be discussed. This article begins with the direct and indirect costs imposed on firms that pay
bribes. Firms that pay bribes spend more time and money dealing with governments, and bear the costs
of distortions of internal resources. The article then examines the negative effects of corruption on
existing relationships within the firm and potential relationships with parties outside of the firm. Finally,
the article examines potential criminal and civil liability that a firm exposes itself to when it pays bribes.
The totality of these costs and liabilities strongly suggest that the consequences for any given firm of
paying a bribe would burden rather than benefit the firm.
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The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws
Philip M. Nichols *

International businesspeople report that bribery presents one of the most frequent and perplexing
issues that they encounter. 1 Their confusion regarding corruption might seem disingenuous.
The past fifteen years have witnessed an explosion of scholarly research on corruption. 2 The
rules on bribery should pose little mystery for an international businessperson faced with a
decision regarding a bribe. And yet, in what David Hess and Thomas Dunfee describe as “the
paradox of corruption,” businesses continue to pay bribes. 3 A closer examination of corruption
research, with an eye toward the guidance that it provides to decision makers, provides some
insight as to why this paradox persists.
From both a macro- and a microdeontological perspective, the rules regarding corruption
are very clear. Every major school of thought includes rules against bribery 4: the Qur’an, for
example, proclaims that “Allah loveth not corrupters,” 5 while the text shared by Judaism and
Christianity admonishes “you shall not accept a bribe.” 6 Sikh doctrine seeks “righteous rule,”
*
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1

See James H. Davis & John A. Ruhe, Perceptions of Country Corruption: Antecedents and Outcomes, 43 J. BUS.
ETHICS 275, 276 (2003) (reporting that the World Bank considers corruption the greatest impediment to global
commercial relationships); Margaret McNeil & Kerry Pedigo, Western Australian Managers Tell Their Stories:
Ethical Challenges in International Business Operations, 30 J. BUS. ETHICS 305, 306 (2001) (discussing surveys
that report that bribe requests are the most frequent ethical problem faced by Australian and U.S. businesspeople).
2

See, e.g., George T. Abed & Sanjeev Gupta, The Economics of Corruption: An Overview, in GOVERNANCE,
CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1, 1 (George T. Abed & Sanjeev Gupta eds., 2002); Daniel Kaufman,
Back to Basics—Ten Myths About Governance and Corruption, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2005, at 41, 41. As recently as a
decade ago, scholars noted that research on corruption “is very much in its nascent stage.” J. Egardo Campos et al.,
Corruption and Its Implications for Investment, in CORRUPTION: THE BOOM AND BUST OF EAST ASIA 11, 21 (J.
Edgardo Campos ed., 2001).
3

David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating
Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 593, 595 (2000); see also David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption
and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 312–13 (2008)
(revisiting the paradox of corruption).

4

Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Organization, 28 L. & POL’Y INT’L
BUS. 305, 321–22 (1997).
5

Sura 28:77 (Muhammad Marmaduke Pickhall trans., 1930); see also Mohammad Saeed et al., International
Marketing Ethics from an Islamic Perspective: A Value-Maximization Approach, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 127, 136 (2001)
(stating that because of a core “regard for the societal welfare . . . Islam condemns bribery unequivocally in all its
forms whether it represents protecting business interests and/or securing greater profits”).

6

Deuteronomy 16:19 (English Standard Version); see also Menachem Elon, The Sources and Nature of Jewish Law
and Its Application in the State of Israel—Part IV, 4 ISR. L. REV. 80, 99 (1969) (stating that the bribery laws of
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which specifically excludes corruption, 7 while the second moral precept of Buddhism “involves
abstinence from all deceptive practices such as bribery that lead to moral disintegration.” 8 Every
country in the world prohibits bribery. 9 The normative and legal rules coincide and could not be
more clear 10: do not pay bribes, even in an international context.
Social contracts also tell the local and transnational businessperson not to pay bribes.
Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee, two leading social contract theorists, propose an
Integrative Social Contract Theory that includes very general macrosocial contracts but leaves
open most moral space for the generation of microsocial contracts by local communities. 11 Both
macrosocial and microsocial contracts, however, must comport with incontestable, nonnegotiated
norms to which Donaldson and Dunfee give the appellation “hypernorms”: “a thin universal
morality . . . principles so fundamental that, by definition, they serve to evaluate low-order norms
. . . reaching to the root of what is ethical for humanity.” 12 Donaldson and Dunfee suggest that
bribery violates a hypernorm of “necessary social efficiency,” which posits that all institutions
and norms should operate to provide people with social goods. 13 Andrew Spicer, building on the
work of Donaldson and Dunfee, suggests that even if one sets aside a hypernorm prohibiting
bribery, when it appears that local communities have negotiated a norm tolerating corruption
their tolerance usually is only behavioral and they still retain a higher aspirational norm

Israel are based on strong Jewish proscriptions of bribery); John T. Noonan Jr., Bribery, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 741, 745–46 (1986) (describing an “intense spiritual hatred of bribery” in Christian literature).
7

HARBANS SINGH, DEGH, TEGH, FAITH: SOCIO-ECONOMIC & RELIGIO-POLITICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF SIKHSIM 141
(1986).

8

U. Dhammaratana, The Social Philosophy of Buddhism, in THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISM 1, 18
(Samdhong Rinpoche et al. eds., 1972).

9

Hess & Dunfee, supra note 3, at 613 (citing JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 702 (1984)); Matt A. Vega, Balancing
Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the
Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 391 (2010).

10

The clarity of the rules does not, of course, ensure that they are correctly perceived. Chong-Yeong Lee and
Hideki Yoshihara note the difference between perception and reality and report that a number of international
businesspeople mistakenly believe that bribery is a normalized practice in other countries. Chong-Yeong Lee &
Hideki Yoshihara, Business Ethics of Korean and Japanese Managers, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 7, 10–11 (1997).
11

Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social
Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252, 260–65 (1994).

12

THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS
ETHICS 43–44 (1999).
13

Id. at 229–30. They also suggest that corruption usually violates a hypernorm providing for “a universal right to
political participation.” Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas J. Donaldson, Untangling the Corruption Knot: Global
Bribery Viewed Through the Lens of Integrative Social Contact Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO BUSINESS
ETHICS 61, 74 (Norman E. Bowie ed., 2002).
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condemning corruption. 14 Social contractarians tell businesspeople that they should not pay
bribes. 15
At the macro level, consequentialist discussions abound in accounts of corruption at the
national and international level. 16 Indeed, many observers attribute the shift in the global legal
community’s willingness to discuss corruption to the transformation of that conversation from a
moral discourse to one that emphasizes economic consequences; 17 Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce
describes the shift “from the moral argument to the economic one” as “a masterstroke.” 18
Scholars such as Susan Rose-Ackerman, Johann Lambsdorff, and Robert Klitgaard have
thoroughly and convincingly marshaled together research that demonstrates the impediment to
economic growth, degradation of social and political institutions, misallocation of resources and
skills, impoverishment, and numerous other societal ills that corruption inflicts on polities and
economies. 19 As Steven Salbu points out, “no nation can miss the clear and highly publicized
conclusion that corruption is economically devastating.” 20

14

Andrew Spicer, The Normalization of Corrupt Business Practices: Implications for Integrative Social Contracts
Theory (ISCT), 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 833, 837–38 (2009). Spicer does not take issue with Donaldson and Dunfee’s
framework; rather, he uses their extensive analysis of corruption, which goes beyond simply finding corruption an
illegitimate violation of a hypernorm, as an opening for his own exploration of the authenticity of local norms
regarding corruption. Id. at 837.

15

See, e.g., Dunfee & Donaldson, supra note 13, at 74. Donaldson and Dunfee acknowledge that in some instances
the admonition to not pay bribes is an incomplete solution and recommend a longer-term approach that combines
“business pressure, legal enforcement, and political will.” DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 230.
16

See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 41 (noting that the majority of corruption research is empirical studies of its
effects).

17

E.g., Padideh Ala’i, The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 259, 273–75
(2008); Beverly Earle, The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery
Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won’t Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT’L L. 207, 208, 226
(1996); see also Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End Corruption in
International Business, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 108, 109–10 (1998) (describing the positive effect that the
change in emphasis has had on research).
18

Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business—The Dawn of a New Era, 24
MELB. U. L. Rev. 349, 364 (2000). But see Chantal Thomas, Does the “Good Governance Policy” of the
International Financial Institutions Privilege Markets at the Expense of Democracy?, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 551, 560
(1999) (lamenting the economic focus of the international financial institutions).
19

See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 38–48 (1988) (discussing and explaining the manners
in which corruption causes misallocations of goods and services, the generation of negative externalities,
inefficiencies, distortion of incentives, the creation of corrupt rents, popular alienation and disenfranchisement,
distortions in administration and bureaucracy, and public outrage, at the societal level); JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF,
THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY 58–134 (2007)
(discussing voluminous empirical research on the damage at the societal level by corruption, developing new models
to explain the relationships between corruption and societal damage, and developing and testing a model to show
that corruption is not simply a transfer of rents); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM 9–26 (1999) (discussing and explaining how corruption leads to regulatory
distortion and evasion, the entanglement of government and organized crime, market distortion and inefficiency,
bureaucratic distortion and malfeasance, systemic degradation, and the delegitimization of and disengagement from
government).
20

Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419,
446 (1999). Bill Shaw points out that the effects of bribery are particularly devastating for emerging economies.

4
Philosophers, theologists, and ethicists have clearly demonstrated the deontological and
social contract proscriptions on bribery at both the macro and micro levels; economists and other
social scientists have demonstrated the destructive consequences that bribery inflicts at the macro
level. Why then is bribery “universally disapproved yet universally present”? 21 The absence
within the literature of a systematic analysis at the firm level of the consequences of breaching
bribery rules, in the tradition of Rose-Ackerman, Lambsdorff, or Klitgaard, could contribute to
the persistence of bribery. From the individual businessperson’s perspective, questions remain
regarding the business case for complying with bribery laws. This article seeks to fill that gap.
There is a dearth of firm-level empirical data on the consequences of paying bribes. In
the last decade, however, some scholars have conducted firm-level inquiries; their findings,
combined with theoretical discussions of corruption and with the regulatory environment, allow
for a reasonable discussion of the consequences at the firm level of paying bribes. Moreover, a
survey of local laws and of international corruption regimes demonstrates the contingent legal
liabilities for the payment of bribes. A very strong business case exists for complying with the
rules regarding bribery.
This article first clarifies the definitions of bribery and corruption. The article then
examines direct and indirect costs of paying bribes 22 and the effect of corruption on potential
relationships. 23 Finally, the article discusses potential criminal liability, particularly in light of
the expansive international legal regime. 24 The totality of these costs and liabilities strongly
suggest that the consequences for any given firm of paying a bribe would burden rather than
benefit the firm.

I. DEFINITIONS AND MODES OF ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION
A. Definitions
Corruption engenders complicated definitional and philosophical debates. 25 This article uses the
most common definition of corruption: abuse or misuse of a position of trust or responsibility
for private gain rather than the purpose for which that trust or responsibility was conferred. 26
Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 689, 691
(2000).
21

Hess & Dunfee, supra note 3, at 595.

22

See infra Part II.

23

See infra Part III.

24

See infra Part IV.

25

Arnold Heidenheimer suggests three broad categories of attempts to define public sector corruption: public officecentered, moral and public interest-centered, and market-based types of definitions. ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER,
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 4 (1970); see also Maryvonne Génaux, Social
Sciences and the Evolving Concept of Corruption, 42 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 13, 13–16 (2004) (discussing the
continued relevance of Heidenheimer’s categorization).
26

Joseph Nye first offered a form of this definition. See Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 & n.10 (1967); see also Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational
Corruption: Regulation Across Borders, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 413, 417 (2007) (referring to Nye’s as the “classic
definition”). This general definition is used by nongovernment organizations such as Transparency International,

5
Corruption can manifest itself in numerous forms, such as nepotism, collusion, or theft. 27 This
article deals primarily with the form of corruption known as bribery. Bribery consists of a
transaction in which a person abuses or misuses a position of trust or responsibility, quid pro quo
something of value. 28 Unfortunately, a great deal of the literature on corruption and bribery
conflates the two terms, and many of the studies referred to in this article use the term
“corruption” even though they examine bribery. 29 This article tries to, but cannot always, avoid
confusion of terms when referring to these studies.
Corruption and bribery can exist in interactions between firms and government or in
interactions solely among private firms. 30 Most of the research discussed in this article takes
account of interactions between firms and government. Private sector corruption—corruption in
interactions between private firms—probably imposes tremendous costs on firms as well, and
also merits serious scholarly attention. 31 Good reasons exist, however, for the focus by scholars
on public sector corruption. At the simplest level, scholars have access to more data concerning
public sector corruption. Public sector corruption also preoccupies scholars because it implicates
the viability of fundamental social institutions. 32 Most of the lessons discerned from an
examination of public sector bribery, however, translate to bribery in any interaction.
B. Dynamic Versus Static Analysis

which defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,” Frequently Asked Questions About
Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last visited Oct. 1,
2011), and the World Bank, which defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain,” World Bank
Grp., Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, WORLD BANK,
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (emphasis
removed). This definition allows for a general discussion of corruption; the legality or illegality of a particular
action depends on the precise wording of the criminal laws of a government having jurisdiction over that action.
27

James P. Wesberry, Jr., International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption Eruption: If the IFIs Put Their
Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption Eruption May Be Capped, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 498,
504 (1998); see also James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 125, 182–83 (2009) (describing other permutations of corruption).

28

ROSE-ACKERMAN, 19 note 19, at 93; Stephen F. Smith, Essay, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
127, 142 (2009) (emphasizing that the U.S. federal bribery statute requires mens rea for an act to rise from a gratuity
to a bribe).
29

See MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY 20–21 (2005)
(bemoaning the confusion of the terms in corruption literature).

30

See Edward C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J.L. & ECON. 587, 591–99
(1975) (distinguishing private sector corruption from public sector corruption).

31

See Blake E. Ashforth et al., Re-Viewing Organizational Corruption, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 670, 672–76 (2008)
(discussing research on the harms of private sector corruption at the firm, industry, national, and systems levels).
32

See Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech
and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1370 (1983) (“When an official is bribed, there is an
immediate harm to the legitimacy of government regardless of the substantive ends the bribe is intended to
achieve.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 427, 463 (1998) (“The absence of exit or other forms of loss protection (i.e., diversification,
insurance, etc.) provides some justification for less tolerance for public corruption relative to private corruption.”).

6
To understand corruption, one must evaluate its effects dynamically rather than statically. Much
of the older “grease money” literature suggested that, in an overly bureaucratized system,
corruption allowed business firms to bypass bureaucracy and therefore lowered costs for those
firms. 33 These analyses conceived of corruption as exogenous to the relationship between a firm
and the bureaucracy. 34 According to this analysis, each bribe affects only that particular
transaction: the background condition of corruption is not affected by the bribe, and bribes are
not affected by the background condition of corruption.
Scholars with experience in corruption, however, describe corruption as dynamically
involved with those bureaucracies. Susan Rose-Ackerman, a groundbreaking scholar on the
political economy of corruption, addresses the exogenous perception of corruption head on: “I
disagree. . . . [T]he authors [who suggest that routine corruption may confer benefits] assume
that officials have only limited discretion. For example, the tax collector ‘discovers’ the tax
liabilities of citizens and firms. In reality, he or she might ‘create’ tax liabilities as a bribe
extraction device.” 35 Field observation strongly supports Rose-Ackerman’s argument. In the
1980s, Robert Wade described the relationships between rice farmers in southern India and
officials of the Irrigation Department. 36 He observed that, among other things, bureaucrats hid
information, delayed action, and obfuscated rules and facts so that they could leverage ever
larger bribes from farmers who needed water. 37 Salim Rashid observed the degradation of a
telephone system in India as bureaucrats created ever longer delays so that they could extract
ever larger bribes. 38 By the 1990s, scholars generally agreed that dynamic analysis provides
more accurate descriptions of the effects of corruption than does static analysis. 39 Dynamic
analysis recognizes the “intertemporal linkages” between decisions: “decisions made today
affect those to be made in the future.” 40 Scholars also agreed that a dynamic analysis generally
indicated that over time the costs of corruption generally outweigh any benefits. 41
33

See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 386 (1968); Nathaniel H. Leff,
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 8, 11 (1964).

34

See Francis T. Lui, An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, 93 J. POL. ECON. 760, 762–66 (1985), for an
example of this type of analysis.
35

ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 16.

36

Robert Wade, The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India, 18 J. DEV.
STUD. 287, 287 (1982).
37

Robert Wade, Irrigation Reform in Conditions of Populist Anarchy: An Indian Case, 14 J. DEV. ECON. 285, 28687 (1984); Wade, supra note 36, at 313–14.
38

Salim Rashid, Public Utilities in Egalitarian LDC’s: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency, 34
KYKLOS: INT’L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 448, 448–55 (1981).
39

See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption—A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15
DICK. J. INT’L L. 451, 454–55 (1997).

40

MICHAEL R. CAPUTO, FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMIC ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS ix (2005).
41

See WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 14-15 (Sept.
1997), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf (stating that, by using
a dynamic analysis, what appears to be a short-term gain can be shown to impose tremendous costs in the long run);
Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption in the Judiciary, 30 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 95, 112 (1999) (“[P]resent corruption decreases future productivity, thereby reducing dynamic
efficiency.”).

7

Businesspeople instinctively recognize the dynamic effects of corruption, even if they do
not always act rationally based on that recognition. Businesspeople recognize that one can earn a
reputation as a dishonest actor or a corrupt business; earning a reputation takes time and occurs
over several interactions. The qualitative literature on corruption overflows with accounts from
businesspeople of the costs accumulated over time associated with the reputational effects of
paying bribes. 42 Two very experienced transnational corporate lawyers describe the experience
of businesses in strong terms:
[W]hen a company first agrees to pay bribes, it is immediately tainted with a reputation
for corruption that is virtually impossible to shake. Virtue, once lost, is rarely ever
regained. One payment quickly becomes two, then four, and so on. The smell of
corruption attracts other would-be bribees like flies, all of whom exert their leverage by
threatening to report previous transgressions. 43

Elizabeth Spahn adds, simply, “The bribe price goes up.” 44
Daniel Kaufman and Shang-Jin Wei suggest dynamic analysis of corruption at the firm
level. 45 They develop a theoretical model that looks beyond the effects of a single transaction.
They base their model on a Stackelberg “game between a rent-seeking government official and a
representative firm,” and then use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium level of
official harassment and cost of time spent with government officials. 46 Their model predicts that
“firms that pay more bribes not only face a higher nominal rate of harassment in equilibrium, but
also have to deal with a higher effective rate of harassment.” 47 They therefore predict, based on
this model, that in the real world firms that pay bribes will bear more, not less, costs due to

42

See ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION: UNDERMINING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENTS, AND
SECURITY 31 (2007) (“Representatives of multinational companies operating overseas describe a consistent trend.
When these companies pay bribes to resolve some short-term nuisance, they report that the bribe-taker returns, the
word spreads, and the demands multiply.”); Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, Are Anti-Corruption Efforts Paying Off?
International and National Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region and Their Impact on India and Multinational
Corporations, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 59, 84 (2009) (discussing revelations of corporate counsels that paying bribes
engenders a reputation which leads to greater bribe demands); Hess & Dunfee, supra note 3, at 609 (reporting
discussions with business leaders regarding value of good reputation with respect to corruption); Tor Krever,
Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 86-87
(2008) (describing reputational costs experienced by firms that have paid bribes).
43

Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corporate Responsibility and Ethical
Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 389, 444 (1997).
44

Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, 887 (2010); see also Krever, supra note 42, at 87
(“Moreover, an official who knows payments have been made in the past can increase bureaucratic interference to
engender further bribes.”).
45

Daniel Kaufman & Shang-Jin Wei, Does “Grease Money” Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? (World Bank
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2254, 1999), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=629191.

46

Id. at 3. The Stackelberg Game is a non-zero-sum, two-player game in which the players do not have information
about each other’s strategies. M. Simaan & J.B. Cruz, Jr., On the Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games, 11
J. OPTIMIZATION THEORY & APPLICATIONS 533, 534 (1973).

47

Kaufman & Wei, supra note 45, at 5.

8
bureaucratic interference. 48 Kaufman and Wei’s model suggests what many businesspeople
already know: the dynamic effects of corruption apply at the firm level as well as at the country
or regional level. These direct and indirect costs imposed on the firm are discussed in the next
section of this article.

II. ENGAGING IN BRIBERY INCREASES DIRECT COSTS AND INDIRECT COSTS
Very few—if any—firms pay bribes in order to enhance the well being of the bribe-taking
government official. Firms pay bribes in hopes of obtaining a business advantage, such as lower
costs, greater efficiencies, or access to relationships or markets. 49 A simplistic, static analysis of
a bribe request might suggest that payment of a bribe could accrue an advantage. More
sophisticated analysis, however, suggests the opposite; empirical evidence also indicates that
corrupt behavior imposes costs on a firm.
A. Bribery Increases Direct Costs
The most starkly demonstrated cost imposed by paying bribes is time spent dealing with
bureaucracy. This may seem counterintuitive, particularly given slang terms for bribes such as
“speed money.” 50 Understanding corruption as a dynamic process, however, casts light on the
cost imposed by bribery. Corruption creates a relationship, perhaps between the bribe payer and
a bribe-taking official, but certainly between the bribe payer and the bureaucracy. 51 Power
resides asymmetrically in the parties: the official has control over a resource or service desired
by the firm, whereas the firm only has money. 52 The official acts as an agent of the state for
purposes of controlling the resource or service but acts out of self-interest when disbursing them,
and thus is not well-constrained by the strictures of responsibility to the state; indeed, market
forces may form a more powerful constraint on a corrupt bureaucrat’s behavior. 53 The firm has
48

Id.

49

ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 92–93.

50

See Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J.
287, 310 (2000) (using the slang term).

51

ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 113.

52

Ronald MacLean Abaroa, Towards 2005: Profits, People, and the Future of the Regulatory State in the Free
Market Model, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 131, 136 (1999); see also Nsongurua J. Udombana, How Should We
Then Live? Globalization and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 293, 343 (2002)
(emphasizing the moral obligation of government to fight corruption given this asymmetry).
53
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already indicated a willingness to pay an illicit fee in order to avoid bureaucratic delay or to
secure administrative approval; nothing exists to prevent the official from creating new and
greater delays or from simply renegotiating the size of the illicit fee.
Jay Pil Choi and Marcel Thum label this process the “ratchet effect” of corruption. 54
Choi and Thum join Kaufman and Wei in developing theoretical models to describe the costs
associated with the ratchet effect. Kaufman and Wei go on to test their theory regarding direct
costs against empirical evidence. Using data from several thousands of responses to surveys
conducted for the Global Competitiveness Report and the World Development Report, 55 holding
other factors constant, and comparing bribe-paying and non-bribe-paying firms within the same
countries, Kaufman and Wei find that “firms that pay more bribes, in equilibrium, experience
more, not less, time wasted with the officials on matters related to regulations.” 56 The same is
true when firms of similar size and other characteristics are compared. 57 The same is true when
comparing only companies operating in Asia. 58 The same is true when different data sets are
analyzed. 59 Firms that pay bribes spend more, not less, time and money in dealing with
government.
Other empirical studies corroborate and amplify these findings. Alejandro Gaviria, for
example, applies a slightly different model to firm-level data from Latin America and still
finds—when directly comparing firms that pay bribes to firms that do not pay bribes—that the
payment of bribes increases rather than lowers costs for an individual firm. 60 Jakob Svensson,
using very detailed firm-level data from Uganda, finds no evidence for the “grease money”
hypothesis but does find that paying bribes damages firm operations. 61
Donato De Rosa, Nishaal Gooroochurn, and Holger Görg explicitly test, at the firm level,
the hypothesis that bribery acts as “grease” that allows firms to escape burdensome regulation. 62
They find no empirical evidence to support that hypothesis. 63 De Rosa, Gooroochurn, and
Görg’s study also yielded two additional empirical observations quite pertinent to a business case
54
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to not pay bribes. They compare the costs imposed on a firm by the payment of bribes to the
costs imposed by lengthy bureaucratic processes. 64 They find that the payment of bribes
imposed real and significant costs on firms, but that—contrary to almost any prediction—the
bureaucratic delay experienced by firms not paying bribes did not impose significant costs. 65
They also find that the costs imposed on firms by paying bribes were greater in countries that
experienced higher background levels of corruption. 66 In other words, even though a firm might
operate in a country where corruption seems “normal,” that firm would still accrue costs rather
than benefits by paying bribes when compared to firms that do not pay bribes.
Kaufman and Wei also examined the cost of acquiring capital. In many countries
bureaucrats can exert considerable control over the flow of capital. 67 If bribes do in fact
facilitate government action, then firms that pay bribes should obtain capital at lower costs. In
fact, Kaufman and Wei found the opposite to be true: “firms that have paid more bribes also have
a higher, not lower, cost of capital.” 68 In general, corruption increases the cost of raising capital
through bonds and decreases the value of equity. 69
Paying bribes increases costs as well as the amount of time spent interacting with
bureaucrats. These consequences alone create a strong business case against the payment of
bribes. High direct costs, however, are not the only consequences of the payment of bribes.
B. Bribery Lowers Rates of Growth
Empirical studies indicate that firms that pay bribes experience lower rates of growth. Raymond
Fisman and Jakob Svensson compare, at the firm level, the effect of the payment of bribes and
the payment of taxes on firm growth. 70 Fisman and Svensson use firm-level data from firms in
several industries in Uganda. 71 They recognize that the apparent relationship between the
payment of bribes and growth can be deceptive because high-growth or high-profit firms may
choose to pay or be targeted for the payment of higher bribes. 72 They therefore develop a model
to factor out growth factors endogenous to corruption and compare firms with comparable

64
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characteristics. 73 They find “robust evidence that higher corruption is associated with lower firm
growth.” 74 Specifically, they find that a one percent increase in the rate of bribery “is associated
with a reduction in firm growth of more than three percentage points.” 75 Intriguingly, they also
find that the payment of bribes is three times more damaging to growth than payment of an
equivalent amount of taxes. 76 These findings specifically include short-term growth. 77
Alejandro Gaviria does not examine the effect of paying bribes on general firm growth;
rather, he examines at the firm level the effect of paying bribes on the growth of sales. 78 He uses
survey data from more than twenty countries across Latin America. 79 Like Fisman and
Svensson, Gaviria distinguishes his study from other research on the relationship between
corruption and performance by engaging in firm-level analysis, factoring out other conditions
that might affect comparative growth in sales. 80 As an empirical matter, Gaviria finds that the
payment of bribes does not lead to more sales growth but in fact actually lowers sales growth. 81
More generally, he also finds that the payment of bribes lowers investment and employment
growth, which suggests lower overall growth. 82
None of these findings support an argument that bribery confers an advantage. Indeed,
these studies suggest that the payment of bribes renders a firm less competitive. Lower rates of
growth could in part be attributed to the additional costs accrued through paying bribes. Lower
rates of sales growth, however, strongly suggest a negative dynamic effect of bribery: the
payment of a bribe leads to more interference and more demands for bribes, igniting a vicious
circle in which the payment of more bribes leads to demands for more bribes rather than to
bureaucratic transparency and facilitation.
C. Bribery Is Related to Lower Productivity
“Productivity,” in general, has to do with output per factor; 83 at the firm level one important
measure has to do with the efficient relationship between capital and labor. 84 No empiricist has
conducted firm-level research on the extent to which paying bribes affects productivity. Johann
Graf Lambsdorff has, however, studied the effects of corruption on firm productivity through
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country comparison. 85 Lambsdorff predicts that corruption will decrease productivity because
corruption distorts decision making, allocation of resources, and the creation of relationships. 86
Empirical analysis supports this prediction. Lambsdorff finds that corruption significantly
reduces productivity: a ten percent increase in the average amount of corruption experienced by
firms in the aggregate reduces productivity by two percent. 87 Using Tanzania and the United
Kingdom as examples, he finds that if Tanzanian firms experienced the levels of corruption
experienced by British firms, total output of the Tanzanian firms would increase by twenty
percent. 88
Ernesto Dal Bó and Martín Rossi conduct a similar study, still comparing firms in the
aggregate but comparing only firms within a single industry (electric utility companies) and a
single region (Latin America). 89 Dal Bó and Rossi predict that bribery inhibits growth because
“in a corrupt environment the fate of a firm is not tightly related to managerial efforts devoted to
supervising and coordinating the use of productive factors.” 90 Turning to the empirical data,
they too find a strong association between experience with corruption and less productive use of
capital. 91 They too use countries to illustrate the magnitude of the effect; their research indicates
that if electric utilities in Brazil experienced corruption only to the extent that companies in
Costa Rica experienced corruption, those utilities would use seven percent fewer workers to
provide the same amount of electricity that they provide today. 92
Lower productivity again demonstrates the dynamic effect of bribery and corruption. A
firm that pays bribes becomes embroiled in a relationship in which it is to the bureaucrat’s
advantage to create delays and obstacles that the firm must then pay to have removed.
Moreover, the firm may have no easy route for exit from this relationship. As Elizabeth Spahn
points out, the bureaucrat has a strong incentive to maintain the relationship and can release
embarrassing or incriminating information about the firm if the firm attempts to leave the
relationship. 93

III. PAYING BRIBES NEGATIVELY AFFECTS RELATIONSHIPS
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Bribery’s effect on time, money, growth, and productivity is a product of the dynamic
relationship between a bribe-paying firm and a bribe-taking public official. Bribery also
diminishes relationships other than the relationship between the firm and the public official, and
its effect on those relationships can impose indirect costs on a firm. Bribery affects both internal
and external relationships; this article discusses each in turn.
A. Bribery Damages Internal Relationships
The payment of bribes creates a workplace in which employees are more likely to steal materials
or opportunities from the employer. Many factors contribute to a decision by an employee to
engage in misconduct. 94 The firm’s “ethical climate,” however, sends very powerful signals to
employees about appropriate and acceptable behaviors. 95 Bart Victor and John Cullen created an
early typography of ethical climates, describing them as self-interested, benevolent, or
principled. 96 David Fritzsche points out that these three categories reflect three dominant
categories of ethical frameworks: egoism, utilitarianism, and deontology. 97 Others have
subsequently offered more nuanced categories. 98 Regardless of the schema used, the fact that a
firm’s organizational climate can create an environment of self-serving, egoistic behavior
constitutes the salient insight. 99
Behaviors engaged in, condoned by, or rewarded by managers play a large role in
creating the ethical environment. Large firms seeking to enhance the ethical quality of their
enterprises are advised to set the tone from the top. 100 The same is patently true of small firms;
in a survey of small enterprise professionals, “[t]he majority of respondents reported that top
management set the ethical tone for the organization and had the most influence on unethical
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decisions.” 101 Rule-breaking behavior by managers, therefore, creates a workplace environment
in which employees consider self-serving behaviors acceptable.
Empirical studies have directly linked the payment of bribes by firms to self-serving
misbehaviors by employees. In controlled laboratory experiments, participants who were
rewarded by supervisors for cheating by offering bribes during games were more likely than
other participants to engage in self-serving behaviors. 102 A survey of municipal office workers
found that the single greatest factor contributing to self-serving behavior was the observation of
bribe-taking by managers. 103 Indeed, mere exposure to the tolerance of bribe-giving in a firm has
been found to significantly contribute to self-serving misbehavior. 104 Conversely, studies of
South African firms in which purchasing departments adhered to high standards of conduct
found that a strong and shared ethical climate constituted a critical element in the departments’
good performances. 105
Self-serving misbehavior imposes very burdensome costs on firms. Kickbacks, for
example, rob firms of discounts or other savings that should accrue to the firm or burden the firm
with shoddy goods and services. 106 Workplace theft and fraud impose even greater costs. “The
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners . . . has reported that the typical U.S. firm loses six
percent of its annual revenues to employee fraud.” 107 This translates to almost seven hundred
billion U.S. dollars lost each year to employee misconduct. 108 Worldwide data is difficult to
obtain, but the numbers that are available depict a staggering problem. Employee theft—a subset
of employee misconduct—imposes serious costs; by one estimate employee theft costs firms
around the world over one hundred billion dollars each year. 109 Chinese firms lose over nineteen
billion U.S. dollars to employee theft alone; 110 even Australian and New Zealand firms lose
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almost a billion dollars each year. 111 These hits to the bottom line have profound and tangible
effects: “The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that . . . 30% of corporate bankruptcies are
a direct result of employee theft.” 112
Empiricists who study the connection between firm bribery and self-serving misbehavior
by employees reach consensus on the means to reduce the harmful misbehavior inside the firm:
managers should stop paying or tolerating the payment of bribes to parties outside of the firm. 113
Those bribes create an environment in which employees are more likely to consider self-serving
misbehavior appropriate. The actions, such as office theft, which are associated with an
environment in which people consider self-serving misbehavior to be appropriate constitute a
significant cost associated with the paying bribes.
B. Bribery Damages or Precludes External Relationships
The payment of a bribe could affect relationships with a potential customer of goods or services.
Little empirical research exists to show the extent to which this happens, but at least two aspects
of this consequence merit attention.
First, to the extent that customers include members of the general public, in most
countries that public despises corruption. Survey after survey demonstrates that even in
countries experiencing endemic corruption people dislike the practice and understand the harm it
inflicts on their society. Sahr John Kapundeh, for example, found that even while Sierra Leone
suffered myriad nation-threatening crises, respondents to his survey singled corruption out for
particular condemnation. 114 Surveys reveal high levels of societal rebuke in countries in a
variety of economic or political states including, for example, Cameroon, 115 Kazakhstan, 116

111
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Peru, 117 Romania, 118 and South Asia, 119 as well as students in Bulgaria, Mongolia, 120 and
Russia. 121 Anecdotal evidence suggests that after the collapse of the corrupt Suharto regime in
Indonesia, firms that collaborated with Suharto had difficulty marketing within Indonesia. 122
Firms should recognize the possibility of damage to relationships with the broad pool of potential
customers, even though the damage is inchoate.
Second, the payment of bribes definitively precludes relationships with a growing
number of specific customers. Most international financial institutions, as well as many
governments, maintain lists of suppliers and consultants debarred from contracts or projects due
to involvement in corruption. 123 The World Bank, for example, not only debars firms and
consultants who have acted corruptly in association with a World Bank project, but it also debars
firms and consultants that have been debarred by the Asian Development Bank and European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 124 China excludes corrupt actors from government
projects, 125 as does the United States. 126 Exclusion from custom with these institutions and
governments is not inconsequential; these bodies are involved in trillions of dollars of projects
each year. 127
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Firms that pay bribes also severely constrict the number of foreign parties with whom
they can form other relationships. Several empirical studies have found that foreign investors
avoid corrupt countries in general. Paolo Mauro conducted one of the earliest of these studies. 128
He finds a “negative association between corruption and [foreign] investment, as well as growth,
[that] is significant in both a statistical and an economic sense.” 129 Numerous studies, using
differing methodologies and sets of data, corroborate Mauro’s findings. Victor M. Gastanaga,
Jeffrey B. Nugent, and Bistra Pashamova, for example, examine corruption and other possible
inhibitors of foreign investment in the context of the effects of government reforms and find that
corruption diminishes foreign investment. 130 Beata K. Smarzynska and Shang-Jin Wei use a
finer data set, analyze from a firm level, focus particularly on the effects inside emerging
economies, and find that “more corruption in a host country is associated with a lower
probability of [foreign] investment.” 131 Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki find that corruption
inhibits foreign investment but also find that the effect is amplified as the distance grows
between the level of corruption in the host country and the home country of the investor. 132 In
other words, a firm located in a country with relatively high levels of corruption faces obstacles
in forming investment relationships with foreign parties, and even greater obstacles creating
investment relationships with foreign parties who are themselves not prone to act corruptly.
Many reasons probably explain the decision at the individual firm level to resist forming
investment relationships in relatively more corrupt countries. Corrupt relationships, as has been
discussed in this article, impose direct costs; rational investors would choose to avoid those
costs. 133 Corruption creates an environment of opacity, obfuscation, and delay, which often
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other than high tech companies are more likely to use the joint venture form to invest into more corrupt countries.
Id. at 12.
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Mohsin Habib & Leon Zurawicki, Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment, 33 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 291, 303
(2002).

See Victor Dragotă et al., Some Considerations on the Relationship Between Corruption and Economic Growth,
in RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUE: VALUATION AND ASSET PRICING 71, 75 (Mondher Bellalah et al. eds., 2008)
(noting this possibility but observing that investors are not always rational).
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repels potential investors. 134 Corruption creates uncertainty and instability, which discourages
investment. 135
All of these studies and observations treat the potential investment destination in the
aggregate. An individual firm located in a country with a relatively high level of corruption
might think that because all potential investment partners outside of its country face these
generic difficulties regardless of whether that particular company pays bribes, paying bribes will
not cause further negative consequences. Such reasoning, of course, is not correct: at the local
level a firm that pays bribes has greater costs and uses resources less effectively, and it would
probably be unattractive to a foreign firm on that basis alone. Regardless, one factor that repels
foreign relationships does so at the firm level and absolutely flows from the actions of the
individual firm: liability.
The next section of this article discusses criminal liability as a consequence of the
payment of a bribe. Criminal liability for the payment of bribes can be severe. 136 Firms
understandably seek to avoid those penalties and seek to avoid relationships that will expose
them to liability. Indeed, a survey of international businesses commissioned by Deloitte found
that in one year nearly two-thirds of those firms had abandoned projects involving the creation of
an international relationship due to concerns over potential liability for the payment of bribes. 137
A great number of relationships can create such exposure.
The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 138 imposes criminal liability for the
payment or offer of bribes to foreign officials. As it is one of the older laws imposing such
liability, it serves well as an illustration of the extent to which relationships with corrupt actors
can extend liability. 139 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act generally extends jurisdiction over
U.S. firms and individuals for their own actions. 140 U.S. entities can, however, also be held
liable for the actions of parties with whom they have certain relationships. When a U.S. firm
acquires, merges with, or in some cases even acquires the assets of a foreign firm, it also assumes
134

Gastanaga et al., supra note 130, at 1301; Habib & Zurawicki, supra note 132, at 292.

135

Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations,
Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current AntiCorruption Initiatives, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 547, 590 (2000).

136

See infra notes 177–231 and accompanying text (discussing penalties).

137

DELOITTE FINANCIAL ADVISORY SERVICES LLC, LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP: MANAGING RISK IN GLOBAL
INVESTMENTS 7 (2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Content/Articles/Financial%20Advisory%20Services/us_fas_Look%20Before%20You%20
Leap_012711.pdf [hereinafter DELOITTE].
138

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. § 78), amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78), and International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-366 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78).

139

Some mistakenly believe that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act had no analogs. In fact, Sweden also enacted a
law that prohibited the bribery of foreign officials. See David R. Slade, Comment, Foreign Corrupt Payments:
Enforcing a Multilateral Agreement, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 117, 122 n.22 (1981) (discussing the statute, an
amendment to the Swedish Penal Code). The law, however, was drafted in a manner that made application of
jurisdiction very difficult. See generally Michael Bogdan, International Trade and the New Swedish Provisions on
Corruption, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 665 (1979) (evaluating and criticizing the law).

140

As explained in the next section, the United States also extends jurisdiction over a number of foreign actors. See
infra Part IV.
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exposure for criminal liability for bribes that that foreign firm has paid. 141 Parent companies can
often be found criminally liable for bribes paid by subsidiaries, on the theory that the parent is
aware or constructively aware of the bribe; 142 U.S. firms can even be found liable for bribes paid
by foreign firms in which they own large percentages of shares. 143 Parent companies can be held
criminally liable for bribes paid by agents of subsidiaries. 144 U.S. firms are criminally liable for
bribes paid by employees or agents. 145 U.S. firms are also liable for bribes paid by any third
party or intermediary acting on behalf of the U.S. firm. 146 Justin Marceau predicts that U.S.
franchisors will be found criminally liable, when constructive knowledge can be established, for
bribes paid by foreign franchisees. 147 Debra Maryanov points out that because the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act imposes criminal liability for payments to third parties if the U.S. firm
knows or constructively knows that some or all of that payment will be used to pay a bribe, then
U.S. firms can be held criminally liable for payments made to suppliers if they constructively
know that those suppliers use part of the payment to fund bribes. 148
Given the severe criminal liability that can accrue simply from entering into a
relationship with a bribe payer, U.S. firms are advised to be extremely cautious about entering
into relationships. 149 U.S. firms are not alone. Most of the major trading countries in the world
have enacted similar legislation. 150 As just one example, the German Criminal Code states that

141

See H. Lowell Brown, Successor Corporate Criminal Liability: The Emerging Federal Common Law, 49 ARK. L.
REV. 469, 477–82 (1996) (discussing criminal liability for successor companies); Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 247, 252–53 (2010) (pointing out the SEC’s recent attention to mergers and acquisitions); Carolyn
Lindsey, More than You Bargained for: Successor Liability Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 959, 966 (2009) (noting liability for predecessor’s violations). H. Lowell Brown points out that
attempting to circumvent successor liability through creative transactions rarely succeeds. Brown, supra, at 484–99.
142

H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1,
18-19 (1998); Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton Co./TSKJ’s Nigerian
Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 516–17 (2006). A parent is constructively aware if, among
other things, it actively ignores important facts, the corrupt payment is recorded on the subsidiary’s books, or the
subsidiary repeatedly pays bribes. Brown, supra, at 31, 37–38.
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See Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend
of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 285, 305 (2007) (describing such liability and explaining that constructive knowledge of the bribe must be
demonstrated).
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Brown, supra note 142, at 18-19.
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Id. at 35–36; Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 41 (2011); Marceau, supra note 143, at
298–300.
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Marceau, supra note 143, at 298; Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The
Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 545 (2011).

147

Marceau, supra note 143, at 302.
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Debra Cohen Maryanov, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Governance of Labor
Standards in the International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 397, 441-42 (2010).
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DELOITTE, supra note 137, at 3; Lindsey, supra note 141, at 982-83.
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See infra Table 1 (discussing legislation).
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“[w]hoever commits the crime himself or through another shall be punished as a perpetrator.” 151
Germany has explicitly warned that this provision will be used to hold German companies liable
for bribes paid by related parties outside of Germany. 152 Bulgaria imposes administrative rather
than criminal liability on artificial persons. 153 The actions of employees, agents, representatives,
or firms to which the Bulgarian firm has a connection expose Bulgarian firms to administrative
liability; 154 Bulgaria has made clear that this liability extends to the payment of bribes. 155 These
are but two examples of the general point: business firms expose themselves to risk when they
enter into relationships with firms that pay bribes, which engenders reluctance on the part of
those firms to enter into relationships with firms that pay bribes.
When, therefore, a firm pays a bribe, it precludes itself from entering into relationships
with a vast number of transnational entities. Precluding these relationships is not
inconsequential. The extent to which a relationship with a foreign business will benefit any
particular firm depends on complex interactions of idiosyncratic characteristics. 156 In general,
however, relationships with foreign entities often represent the most effective means of acquiring
new machineries or technologies, 157 developing and implementing management and governance
skills, 158 creating broader networks of relationships, 159 and accessing capital. 160 A firm that pays
bribes risks cutting itself off from factors that will allow it to grow and to flourish in the future.

IV. CRIMINAL LIABILITY

151

STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] 945, as
amended, § 25(1) (Ger.), translation available at Criminal Code (Strafgesetzenbuch, StGB), COMP. L. SOC’Y,
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2009 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 9 (Mar. 18, 2011),
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A Meta-Analysis, 40 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1075, 1076 (2009).
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BANK RES. OBS. 191, 228–29 (2002).
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Robert E. Lipsey, Home- and Host-Country Effects of Foreign Direct Investment, in CHALLENGES TO
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Market Structure Effects, 12 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 85, 85–87 (2005).
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When considering the consequences of paying a bribe, a person or firm must take into account
the potential for criminal sanction. 161 Criminal sanctions adhere to bribery through at least two
frameworks: through local laws and through laws sanctioning the bribery of foreign public
officials. Not every jurisdiction imposes criminal liability on legal persons, although a growing
number of countries do so. 162 This article speaks generally of criminal liability and tries to
include both real persons and firms when it is appropriate to do so.
A. Local Law
Virtually every country in the world criminalizes the bribery of its own officials. 163 Albania, for
example, prohibits payments to a government official “to have him act or refrain from acting on
an action connected to his duty or service, or to use his influence toward other authorities in
order to insure favors, courtesies and any other benefits.” 164 Zambia, more verbosely, imposes
criminal penalties on
[a]ny person who by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person, corruptly
gives, promises or offers any gratification to any public officer, whether for the benefit of
that public officer or of any other public officer, as an inducement or reward for doing or
forbearing to do, anything in relation to any matter or transaction, actual or proposed,
with which any public body is or may be concerned. 165

Persons who pay a bribe in Albania or Zambia or any country in between 166 expose themselves
to a risk of criminal liability.
161

See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990
DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (stating that a rational actor considers costs of criminal penalties); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and
Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 55 (2005) (stating that actors take potential costs
of criminal sanctions into account).
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See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1482
(2009) (noting that many jurisdictions are creating corporate criminal liability); Edward B. Diskant, Note,
Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative
Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 129 (2008) (noting that not all countries impose criminal liability on
artificial persons). Whether corporate criminal liability should exist raises complicated issues not addressed in this
article other than to note that, regardless of whether it should exist, it is widely imposed on companies that have paid
bribes. For a discussion on the complexities of corporate criminal liability, see generally William S. Laufer & Alan
Strudler, Corporate Crime and Making Amends, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307 (2007).
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Hess & Dunfee, supra note 3, at 613; Vega, supra note 9, at 391.
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CRIMINAL CODE [CRIM. C.] art. 245 (Alb.).
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Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 1996, Cap. 91, 7 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (2006) § 29(2).

166

Alphabetically (in English), Afghanistan precedes Albania and Zimbabwe follows Zambia; each of these
countries, however, is experiencing profound change and their laws may be in a state of flux. Nonetheless, both
criminalize bribery. Afghanistan for the moment still uses a penal code enacted in 1976. See PENAL CODE,
OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO. 347 (Afg.). Chapter Three of that code lays out extensive provisions regarding bribery. The
law prohibits giving or promising to give “any money, good or other benefit . . . for the purpose of performance of
or abstention from or disruption of a duty which is assigned to him.” Arts. 254–55. Afghan law also prohibits an
interesting version of bribery: “A person who forces an official of public services though oral or material pressure to
do an unrightful work, or hinders the performance of his job obligation or disrupts it, shall be considered as briber
and shall be sentenced to its fixed punishment.” Art. 257. As part of the nation-building process in Afghanistan,
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Some countries do not enforce these laws with vigor, which may lead some firms to
believe that the risk of prosecution equals zero. Such thinking grossly miscalculates the risk. In
general, current failure to enforce a given law does not drain that law of its legal vitality. 167
Prosecution for violation of a generally unenforced statute always remains a possibility. 168
Indeed, aggressive prosecutors can use rarely enforced laws to target or harass people or firms
for which they have some degree of animus. 169 Historically, prosecutors have used corruption
laws to target persons or entities. 170
There is good reason to be especially sensitive to the possibility of prosecution for
payment of a bribe. Laws sometimes lapse into unenforced status because they no longer, or
never did, align with underlying social norms. 171 These statutes are left in criminal codes
because the transaction costs of removing them exceed the burden imposed on the general
public 172 of leaving them in the codes. 173 Prosecutorial discretion aligns the lack of enforcement
with extant norms, which minimizes the public’s impulses to repeal these laws. 174

Italy has taken the lead role in a United Nations project to reform Afghan law and build legal capacity; the eventual
status of the Penal Code is unclear. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel Rothenberg, An Assessment of Justice Sector and
Rule of Law Reform in Afghanistan and the Need for a Comprehensive Plan 10 (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/ihrli/pdf/rome_conference.pdf. At the time of the writing of this
article , Zimbabwe is in a chaotic state while the military junta that has backed President Robert Mugabe’s attempts
to comprehend the democratic impulses that have overtaken the nation. See Jeremiah I. Williamson, Note, Seeking
Civilian Control: Rule of Law, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Zimbabwe, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 389, 401-11 (2010) (describing contestation of law in Zimbabwe). Zimbabwe’s current criminal code,
promulgated in 2004, prohibits bribery of public officials. Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [ch. 9:23],
June 3, 2005, art. 170(1)(b) (Zim.).
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The opposite is true of bribery laws. Rather than functioning to accurately reflect extant
norms, the lack of enforcement of bribery laws occurs because of a malfunction in the legal
process. 175 The general public deeply despises corruption and perceives the failure to enforce
corruption laws as a problem. 176 The nonenforcement of bribery laws, therefore, occurs due to a
malfunction of the process of law; to the extent that the quality of law improves or a different
malfunction occurs, then the likelihood of prosecutions of bribery should change and the risk of
criminal punishment could increase substantially.
The penalties imposed for bribery vary but generally involve imprisonment and fines.
Some countries impose the death penalty for bribery. 177 Albania, referenced above, imposes an
unspecified fine and imprisonment of up to five years; 178 Zambia requires disgorgement of the
benefit and imposes a prison sentence of up to twelve years. 179 Table 1 outlines the criminal
penalties for simple bribery 180 of domestic public officials in polities that are among the twenty
most active in international trade or are among the twenty greatest destinations for inward
foreign investment 181—in other words, countries with which an international businessperson is
most likely to interact.
Table 1: Criminal Penalties for Bribery of Domestic Public Officials
Country
Imprisonment
Fine
182
Australia
up to 10 years
statutory

Corp. Liability
yes 183

175

See Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L.
REV. 353, 367-69 (1997) (distinguishing between nonenforcement of law by well-functioning systems and
nonenforcement due to malfunction of systems).
176

See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
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See John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT’L L.
187, 194 n.58 (1998) (discussing imposition of the death penalty for bribery); Frank E. Vogel, The Trial of
Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 60-61 (2002) (discussing the application of the
death penalty to corrupt acts under Islamic law). But see Matthew Bloom, Note, A Comparative Analysis of the
United States’s Response to Extradition Requests from China, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 194 (2008) (stating that
China is considering abolition of the death penalty for corruption crimes so that European nations will be more
likely to honor extradition requests).

178

CRIM. C. art. 245 (Alb.).

179

Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 1996, Cap. 91, 7 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (2006) art. 41. Afghanistan,
referenced above, supra note 166, imposes a prison sentence of two to ten years and a fine equal to the bribe. PENAL
CODE, OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO. 347 art 255 (Afg.). The bribe itself will be confiscated. Art. 262. Zimbabwe
imposes a prison sentence of not more than twelve years and a fine not greater than three times the amount of the
bribe. Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [ch. 9:23], June 3, 2005, art. 170(1)(b) (Zim.).
180

Some jurisdictions apply additional penalties for bribery of specific officials, or for bribery that occurs in specific
circumstances.
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This list is based on International Monetary Fund estimates for 2010. See Coordinated Direct Investment Survey,
INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://cdis.imf.org/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2011) (listing country-specific data).

182

Criminal Code of 1995 (Cth) pt 7.6, div. 141.1(5) (Austl.).

183

Id. pt 2.5 div 12.1.
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Belgium 184
Brazil 186
Canada 188
China 190
France 192
Germany 194
Hong Kong 196
India 198

6 months to 5 years
2 to 12 years
up to 5 years
according to
seriousness 191
up to 10 years
3 months to 10 years
up to 10 years
up to 1 year

not specified
not specified
not specified
unlimited for legal
persons
€150,000
not specified
up to HK$500,000
unlimited

yes 185
no 187
yes 189
yes
yes 193
yes 195
possible 197
yes 199

184

Loi relative à la répression de la corruption [Bribery Prevention Act] of Feb. 10, 1999, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.]
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Mar. 23, 1999, 9281.
185

CODE PÉNAL [C.PÉN.] art. 5 (Belg.).

186

CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] art. 317(6) (Braz.).

187

Draft Bill number 6826/2010, submitted to the Brazilian legislature in 2010, imposes criminal liability on legal
persons for the crime of bribery. See OECD, Steps Taken to Implement and Enforce the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Brazil, at 2 (June 6, 2011),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/25/42097321.pdf.

188
189

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 121(3) (Can.).
Id. ss. 22.1, 22.2.

Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Fifth National People’s Congress,
Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 389 (China).

190

191

Sentences can include life imprisonment. Id. art. 390.

192

Loi 2000-595 du 30 juin 2000 modifiant le code pénal et le code de procédure pénale relative à la lutte contre la
corruption [Law 2000-595 of June 30, 2000 Amending the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure
Relating to the Fight Against Corruption], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZEETTE OF FRANCE], July 1, 2000, p. 9944.
193

CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 121-22 (Fr.).

194

STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] 945, as
amended, §§334-35 (Ger.).

195

Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz [OWiG] [Administrative Offences Act], May 24, 1968, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL
I [BGBL. I] (Ger.). Germany has long resisted imposing criminal liability on legal persons, instead imposing nearly
identical penalties through an administrative process. See Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporate Criminal Liability and the
ICC Statute: The Comparative Law Challenge, 56 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 333, 343–44 (2009).
196

Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 201, §12(1)(9) (H.K.).

197

Courts in Hong Kong have begun to impose criminal liability on corporations, although not yet for crimes
involving bribery. See Melanie Pritchard, Corporate Manslaughter: The Dawning of a New Era?, 27 H.K. L.J. 40,
55–57 (1997).

198
199

Punishment for Birbery, No. 39 of 1920, PEN. CODE (1975), § 171E (India).

The Indian Supreme Court has ruled that corporations can be held criminally liable, although this holding has not
been applied to bribery. Standard Chartered Bank and Others v. Directorate of Enforcement, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 2622
(India).

25
Ireland 200
Italy 202
Japan 205
Mexico 207
Netherlands 209
Russia 212
Saudi Arabia 215
Singapore 216

up to 10 years
6 months to 5 years 203
up to 3 years, & hard
labor
up to 14 years
up to 12 years
up to 8 years
up to 10 years
up to 7 years

unlimited
not specified
up to ¥2,500,000

yes 201
yes 204
no 206

not specified
€760,000 210
yes 213
Riyal 1,000,000
up to S$100,000

no 208
yes 211
yes 214
no
yes 217

200

Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act of 2001 (Act No. 27/2001) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2001/en.act.2001.0027.pdf.

201

Id. s. 9.

202

CODICE PENALE [C.p.] art. 322 (It.).

203

Italy distinguishes between bribery to induce a public official to perform a legal act, for which the penalty is
imprisonment for between six months and two years, and bribery to induce a public official to commit an illegal act,
for which the penalty is imprisonment for between two years and five years. See id.

204

Like Germany, Italy imposes administrative rather than criminal liability on artificial persons for crimes
including bribery. See Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About
American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 131 (2004).

205

KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [PEN. C.] art. 198 (Japan).

206

Japan does in some circumstances impose criminal liability on legal persons for bribery of foreign officials.
OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Japan, at 17 (Dec. 2011), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/49377330.pdf.

207

Codigo Penal Federal [CFP] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], Oct. 24,
2011, art. 222 (Mex.).

208

Mexico does impose criminal liability on legal persons for bribery of foreign officials. Id. art 222 bis.

209

WETBOEK VAN STRAFRECHT [SR] §178 (Neth.).

210

The Netherlands also confiscates the proceeds of the transaction. Id.

211

Id. § 51.

212

UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 291 (Russ.).

213

The fine levied will be two hundred to one thousand times the current minimum wage or an amount equal to
between seven and twelve months of the income of the bribing person. Id.

214
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII RF OB ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH [KOAP RF] [Code of
Administrative Violations] art. 19.28 (Russ.).
215
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South Korea 218
Spain 220
Sweden 222
Switzerland 224
Taiwan 226
United
Kingdom 227
United States 229

up to 5 years
up to 10 years
up to 2 years
up to 5 years
1 to 7 years
up to 7 years

up to ₩20,000,000
10 x benefit of transaction
statutory
unlimited
TWD 3,000,000
unlimited

yes 219
yes 221
possible 223
yes 225
no
yes 228

up to 15 years 230

3 x benefit obtained

yes 231

The number of years a person may spend in prison for paying a bribe varies in different
jurisdictions, as does the amount of money a firm may pay as a fine. In some jurisdictions an
actor may perceive the risk of detection and prosecution as low. The risk, however, is never zero
and a firm contemplating paying a bribe must always understand that criminal sanction is a
potential consequence.
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B. Laws Prohibiting Bribery of Foreign Officials
A person or firm that pays a bribe also exposes itself to prosecution under extraterritorial
laws forbidding payments of bribes. Generally, these laws prohibit bribery of foreign officials,
but in operation they could apply to a local firm or person who bribes a local official. 232
For many years the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was the best known of
these types of laws, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act still shapes the behaviors of many
transnational businesses. 233 Dozens of practice guides provide detailed discussion of the
operation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; 234 this article leaves discussion of the intricacies
of the Act to those guides and instead focuses on the risk of negative consequences for the act of
paying a bribe. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits firms or persons from directly or
indirectly paying or offering to pay anything of value to foreign officials in order to obtain or
retain business. 235 Violations can result in fines of up to two million U.S. dollars for each
violation and, for individual actors, imprisonment for up to five years. 236 Additional penalties
administered by the government include forfeiture of government licenses, debarment from
government contracts, and disgorgement of profits connected to the bribes. 237 The United States
Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), administrators of the
Act, do not easily succumb to ruses intended to shield a firm from liability; bribes paid through
232
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Act).
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of scholarly analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, see Earle, supra note 17; Barbara Crutchfield George et
al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitude Toward Corruption in Business
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third parties or payments made with a purposeful lack of knowledge of purpose expose a firm to
liability. 238
Jurisdiction under the Act extends to U.S. firms, citizens, and residents; to firms with
securities listed on a U.S. exchange or registered with the SEC, as well as firms required to file
reports with the SEC; to employees and agents of firms subject to jurisdiction; and to persons
involved in the payment of bribes, any part of which includes conduct that is connected to the
territory of the United States—including, for example, an e-mail sent to a party in the United
States or a payment that includes routing through a bank in the United States. 239 Amy
Westbrook even suggests that the United States may extend jurisdiction if the payment of a bribe
affects markets in the United States. 240 Any person or firm evaluating the potential
consequences of paying a bribe must take into account the broad reach of the United States’
jurisdiction, which includes persons and firms outside of the United States. 241 As Mike Koehler
notes, “the undeniable fact [is] that FCPA risk is omnipresent.” 242
A person evaluating the potential consequences of paying a bribe must also understand
that many countries have enacted laws similar to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. More than
fifty countries criminalize bribery of foreign officials. These countries are listed in Table 2. 243
Table 2: Countries that Criminalize Bribery of Foreign Officials
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Westbrook, supra note 146, at 553–54.
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Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Estonia
Finland

France
Germany
Greece
Guatemala
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Luxemburg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway

Panama
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay

More countries will join this list. Several international organizations require members to
criminalize transnational bribery. The African Union, for example, has promulgated the African
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 244 which requires members to prohibit
bribery of foreign officials; 245 forty-five members have signed the convention and thirty-one
have ratified it. 246 The Organization of American States also requires members to criminalize
transnational bribery. 247
The laws enacted by these countries share with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act the
characteristic of criminalizing transnational bribery. The Russian law, signed into effect in the
spring of 2011, criminalizes bribery of foreign officials in connection with international
business; the law applies to both legal and natural persons and imposes large fines for
violations. 248 Also enacted as of the spring of 2011, the anti-bribery legislation of the People’s
Republic of China includes a provision imposing criminal liability for bribes paid or offered to
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African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, opened for signature July 11, 2003, 43
I.L.M. 5.
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See James Forole Jarso, The Media and the Anti-Corruption Crusade in Kenya: Weighing the Achievements,
Challenges, and Prospects, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 33, 42 (2011) (discussing provisions of the African Union
Convention).
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247
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Payments” Exception to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 471, 485 (2010) (discussing
the Organization of American States and other conventions requiring the criminalization of transnational bribery).
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foreign officials in order to seek an unjust commercial benefit. 249 The law applies to natural and
legal persons, including joint ventures. Penalties for violations of this law include imprisonment
for up to ten years as well as fines. 250 China has not yet had time to demonstrate the vigor with
which it will enforce this law; the central government of China, however, has in general
demonstrated a commitment to prosecuting corruption cases. 251
Many of the laws criminalizing bribery of foreign officials have broader jurisdictional
application than even that of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Hungary, for example, not only
extends jurisdiction to bribes paid within Hungary’s territory or by Hungarian citizens and
companies abroad, 252 but it also may prosecute nonnationals for the payment (or receipt) of
bribes if the conduct is a crime in the place where it occurred. 253 In other words, Hungary’s
courts may extend jurisdiction over a person who pays a bribe to a foreign official almost any
place in the world, regardless of any substantial connection to Hungary. 254 Iceland extends
jurisdiction to acts that have a substantial connection to the territory of Iceland, but will also
prosecute a person apprehended on the territory of Iceland even if the bribe had no connection to
Iceland. 255 At the discretion of the King, the antibribery law of Norway can be extended to nonNorwegian nationals for acts committed entirely outside of Norway. 256
The breadth of behaviors prohibited by many of these laws also exceeds that of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Act, for example, famously exempts “facilitating payments”
(bribes paid to secure nondiscretionary government actions). 257 The same is not true of myriad
other laws that criminalize bribes paid to foreign officials. 258 Mexico, for example, does not
provide an exception for facilitating payments, 259 nor does Luxembourg 260 or Japan. 261 The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act applies only to bribes paid to obtain or retain business; many
Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress, Feb. 25, 2011, effective May 1, 2011), art. 164 (China).
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countries criminalize any bribe paid to a foreign official. The Czech Republic, 262 Denmark, 263
Germany, 264 and Poland, 265 to name but a few, extend jurisdiction to all forms of bribery
committed abroad and do not limit application of their laws to bribes paid in furtherance of
business.
The laws of the United Kingdom merit special mention. The United Kingdom suffered a
great deal of embarrassment for its failure to pursue bribes paid abroad by the British defense
company BAE. 266 In response, the United Kingdom enacted the ambitious Bribery Act of 2010,
which entered into force in the summer of 2011. 267 The Bribery Act, as is true of many
countries’ laws, “reaches more conduct” than the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 268 The Bribery
Act, for example, not only prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign officials, but it also imposes
strict liability for failure to prevent bribes. 269 It extends jurisdiction not only to British nationals
and businesses, but also to acts of bribery that have a “close connection” to the United Kingdom,
which might include market effect. 270 Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer, and Michael S. Diamant
note that the jurisdictional reach combined with the strict liability provisions “could have a
profound impact on multinational corporations.” 271
Most importantly, however, the United Kingdom has committed itself to pursuing bribe
payers and prosecuting them with this law. 272 The United States has demonstrated a similar
commitment. Law enforcement officials in the United States have described prosecution of
transnational bribery laws as “a national-security imperative” second only to antiterrorism laws
as an enforcement priority. 273 Prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act have
increased exponentially, and many predict an even greater increase in prosecution of
nonnationals. 274 The United Kingdom and United States are not alone. “By any calculation,
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international anti-bribery enforcement is increasing worldwide, as more countries move slowly
from enacting anti-bribery laws to initiating actions to identify and prosecute the individuals and
companies who break them.” 275
The global trend toward vigorous enforcement of antibribery laws brings with it the
possibility of overlapping jurisdiction. 276 A hypothetical U.S national working for a
manufacturing branch located in China of a Singaporean and German joint venture with a
significant market presence in Britain who paid a bribe to an Indonesian government official
while at a meeting in South Korea would be subject to liability under each of the criminal laws of
Germany, Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China, Singapore, South Korea, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. If she tried to flee on Icelandic Airlines she would be subject to
arrest and prosecution during the layover in Reykjavik. Wherever she went in the world, she
would be subject to prosecution by Hungary. This hypothetical is designed to illustrate the
potential for extensive overlap, but it is far from fanciful. Stephen Kobrin, among others, writes
of the post-Westphalian business reality, in which businesses form multiple chains of
relationships with little regard for political borders. 277 A firm that pays a bribe is subject to
punishment by each of the states that can claim jurisdiction over that act, and those claims may
be plentiful. When considering the consequences of paying a bribe, a firm must include the
possibility of multiple criminal prosecutions.

CONCLUSION
The rules regarding bribery are clear at both the macro and the micro levels: individuals and
firms may not pay bribes. Scholars have also examined the consequences of bribery at the macro
level, and that research has been marshaled together in a comprehensive manner: the
consequences can be devastating. However, although empirical and theoretical research has been
conducted at the micro level, that research has not been marshaled together in the same way. The
lack of a comprehensive overview of the firm- and individual-level consequences of paying
bribes perhaps contributes to the continued payment of bribes by firms even though the rules
clearly prohibit those bribes. The failure of scholarship to discuss the consequences at the micro
level could also be interpreted as the failure to state a business case for not paying bribes.
This article provides a comprehensive overview of the likely or potential outcomes that
flow from paying bribes. The payment of bribes initiates a dynamic relationship between the
bribe payer and a bureaucracy. That relationship, as well as the bribe itself, engenders
consequences. In general, the payment of bribes increases the costs borne by a firm and increases
the amount of time that firm will spend interacting with bureaucracies. The firm is likely to
275
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experience lower rates of growth and lower productivity than firms that do not pay bribes. The
firm that pays bribes will be debarred from participating in a number of lucrative projects and
will not be able to enter into beneficial relationships with transnational actors. Individuals in the
firm, as well as the firm itself, expose themselves to criminal prosecution, fines, and
imprisonment. The expansive international legal regime increases the likelihood that the bribepayer has violated multiple laws and bears potential liability in multiple jurisdictions.
From a scholarly perspective, the research on consequences at the micro level
complements the research on consequences at the macro level. Bribery imposes costs on the
firm or the individual and degrades relationships in which that firm or individual is involved.
From the perspective of an actual business or businessperson, the research as a whole presents a
strong business case for complying with rules that prohibit the payment of bribes and for
developing programs and policies that ensure compliance with laws prohibiting the payment of
bribes. Firms that develop and implement such programs and thereby avoid paying bribes
should also avoid the costs imposed by the payment of bribes and enjoy an advantage over firms
that continue to pay bribes.

